International Energy Workshop: A Progress Report by Manne, A.S. & Schrattenholzer, L.
THE INTERNATIONAL INSTITUTE FOR APPLIED SYSTEMS ANALYSIS 
is a nongovernmental research institution, bringing together scientists from around the 
world to work on problems of common concern. Situated in Laxenburg, Austria, IIASA 
was founded in October 1972 by the academies of science and equivalent organizations of 
twelve countries. Its founders gave IIASA a unique position outside national, disciplinary, 
and institutional boundaries so that it might take the broadest possible view in pursuing 
its objectives : 
To promote international cooperation in solving problems arising from social, economic, 
technological, and environmental change 
To create a network of institutions in the national member organization countries and 
elsewhere for joint scientific research 
To develop and formalize systems analysis and the sciences contributing to it, and promote 
the use of analytical techniques needed to evaluate and address complex problems 
To inform policy advisors and decision makers about the potential application of the 
lnstitute's work to such problems 
The Institute now has national member organizations in the following countries: 
Austria 
The Austrian Academy of Sciences 
Bulgaria 
The National Committee for Applied 
Systems Analysis and Management 
Canada 
The Canadian Committee for IIASA 
Czechoslovakia 
The Committee for IIASA of the 
Czechoslovak Socialist Republic 
Finland 
The Finnish Committee for IIASA 
France 
The French Association for the 
Development of Systems Analysis 
German Democratic Republic 
The Academy of Sciences of the German 
Democratic Republic 
Federal Republic of Germany 
Association for the Advancement 
of IIASA 
Hungary 
The Hungarian Committee for Applied 
Systems Analysis 
Italy 
The National Research Council 
Japan 
The Japan Committee for IIASA 
Netherlands 
The Foundation IIASA-Netherlands 
Poland 
The Polish Academy of Sciences 
Sweden 
The Swedish Council for Planning and 
Coordination of Research 
Union of Soviet Socialist Republics 
The Academy of Sciences of the Union 
of Soviet Socialist Republics 
United States of America 
The American Academy of Arts and 
Sciences 
.. 
INTERNATIONAL ENERGY WORKSHOP: A PROGRESS REPORT 
Alan S. Manne 
Stanford University 
Palo Alto, California, USA 
Leo Schrattenholzer 
International Institute for Applied Systems Analysis 
Laxenburg, Austria 
RR-87-2 
February 1987 
Reprinted from OPEC Review, volume 10 (1986). 
INTERNATIONAL INSTITUTE FOR APPLIED SYSTEMS ANALYSIS 
Laxenburg, Austria 
Research Reports, which record research conducted at IIASA, are independently reviewed before 
publication. However, the views and opinions they express are not necessarily those of the Institute or 
the National Member Organizations that support it . 
Reprinted with permission from OPEC Review, 10 (1986), 287-320. 
Copyright© 1986, Organization of the Petroleum Exporting Countries (Vienna). 
All rights reserved. No part of this publication may be reproduced or transmitted in any form or by 
any means, electronic or mechanical, including photocopy, recording, or any information storage or 
retrieval system, without permission in writing from the copyright holder. 
Printed by Novographic, Vienna, Austria 
FOREWORD 
The International Energy Workshop (IEW) is a network of analysts concerned with 
international energy issues. Its aims are to compare long-term energy projections and to 
understand the reasons for diverging views . The IEW conducts iterative polling on key 
energy issues and publishes the results of these polls semi-annually . The pool results are 
discussed in annual meetings , alternating between Europe and North America. Participa-
tion in the IEW is informal and is open to anyone supporting the aims of the Workshop. 
This report by Professor Manne of Stanford University and Dr. Schrattenholzer of 
IIASA describes the status and progress of the IEW in mid-1985. It served as background 
for the meeting held at IIASA in June 1985 . 
T.H. LEE 
Director 
International Institute for Applied Systems Analysis 

International Energy Workshop: a progress 
report 
Prof Alan S. Manne and Dr Leo Schrattenholzer 
THIS PAPER REVIEWS the activities of the International Energy Workshop 
(IEW) during the years 1984- 85. Our report is focused upon the interna-
tional oil price. We present frequency distributions of oil price projections 
made at different times. These lead to two major observations. First, the 
range of projections is wide, eliminating the hope that there might be at least 
a near-consensus among experts about the oil price developments. Secondly, 
the trend (median) of the oil price projections reflects the movement of cur-
rent prices. The median projection of oil prices in the year 2000 has dropped 
by almost 40 per cent between 1981 and 1985. This mirrors the trend in cur-
rent prices between these years. 
These two observations are consistent with a "random walk" model of 
oil prices. This model - like any other model - makes simplifying 
assumptions, but it exhibits an important feature, i.e. it produces a range of 
outcomes rather than a single value . The model thus emphasizes the uncer-
tainty of projections into the future. Moreover, it clearly shows that the range 
of uncertainty widens as one looks further ahead. Basing this model upon the 
actual annual changes in the international oil price between 1970 and 1984 
(and eliminating the biggest change as a statistical "outlier"), a range larger 
than I :3 is needed to include the oil price in the year 2000 with a probability 
of two-thirds. This means that the results of the random walk model suggest 
an even greater range of uncertainty than is indicated by the JEW poll itself. 
Thus, the main result of the IEW is not a "best forecast" but a quantifi-
cation of the range of uncertainty of the oil price projections. This means that 
the oil price of the more distant future cannot be assumed as a variable that 
can be calculated with reasonable precision. In decision-making, it is there-
fore risky to use any single number for the future oil price when attempting 
to quantify the consequences of decision alternatives. It seems much more 
reasonable to check decisions with a large number of possibilities and to 
hedge against both upside and downside risks. 
In the remainder of our paper, we summarize the poll results with re-
spect to energy quantities supplied and demanded: primary energy 
consumption; and oil and gas production, consumption and international 
trade. 
The authors are members of the International Institute for Applied Systems Analysis at 
Laxenburg, Austria. They are grateful to Alexander Svoronos for his assistance in the 
preparation of this paper. 
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The results are reported from two special surveys. One deals with the 
role of modelling methods for projecting international oil prices and the 
other with demand elasticities. 
1. The activities of the International Energy Workshop 
The International Energy Workshop provides a network for communi-
cation between analysts concerned with long-term international energy 
issues. It conducts iterative polling, compares alternative projections, and at-
tempts to understand the reasons for diverging views. The poll results began 
to appear in 1981 and are now published semi-annually. They are discussed 
in annual meetings, alternating between Europe and North America. Partici-
pation in the JEW is informal and is open to anyone supporting the aims of 
the Workshop. 
The poll covers only those items that are comparable in existing inter-
national energy statistics: crude oil prices, GNP growth, primary energy 
consumption, production and trade, and electricity generation. Typically, the 
respondents provide a "surprise-free" reference case. In addition, there may 
be alternative scenarios related, for example, to different economic growth 
rates. 
No explicit probability estimates are assigned to the individual 
projections. Each reader is left to draw his own conclusions as to their 
plausibility. Some of the responses are generated by formal models and some 
by informal methods. All that is required is that an individual response con-
stitute a logically consistent scenario for a given country or region. 
The results are grouped geographically according to a standardized list 
of eight major regions, plus five individual countries/regions for which there 
are five or more poll responses. In addition, there is a geographical category 
labelled NEC, not classified elsewhere. Table 1 summarizes the regional 
distribution of the responses included in the January 1985 edition of the poll . 
Altogether, there were 345 individual responses from 75 participants. On 
average, each participant provided five responses covering alternative scena-
rios and/or regions. 
Thanks to the United Nations Statistical Office, the quality of the JEW 
data base has been greatly improved. We are now in a position to compare 
UN energy statistics (for 1970-1982) with the poll medians for 1980, 1990, 
2000 and 2010. Unlike earlier editions of the poll, there is only one area -
the international oil trade - in which there are major inconsistencies in the 
1980 base year statistics. If the UN energy statistics are taken literally, the 
world has become a net importer of crude oil and there has been a growing 
trend in this direction since 197 5 ! Some of these difficulties represent defini-
tional problems (bunkers, products versus crude oil, etc), but others are ap-
parently associated with national secrecy concerning the oil trade. 
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Table 1 
Regional distribution of responses 
1. SU/EE (Soviet Union and Eastern Europe) 
2. CH/ AP (China and other Asian planned economies) 
3. CPE (Centrally planned economies). sub-total 
4. OECD 
5. OPEC 
6. NODC (Non-OPEC developing countries) 
7. MKT (Market economies), sub-total 
8. WORLD, total 
9. Individual countries/regions 
Canada 
Japan 
Latin America 
OECD Europe 
us 
NEC (Not elsewhere classified) 
No. of 
responses 
10 
10 
15 
29 
21 
16 
32 
22 
5 
11 
8 
14 
23 
129 
Total 345 
The IEW is in its fifth year. It has become possible to make comparisons 
not only between contemporary projections, but also between those made at 
different times. When making these comparisons, however, it must be recog-
nized that the group of individual respondents has not remained constant 
from one survey to the next and that this change of the underlying sample 
could explain part of the observed change. 
The 1985 edition of the IEW poll contains only those responses bearing 
publication dates of 1983 or later. It is essential to standardize for the date of 
publication if we are to obtain a better understanding of the wide range of 
views among different groups making long-term projections of international 
crude oil prices. 
2. International oil prices 
Figure 1 contains a frequency distribution of international crude oil 
price projections - taking only a portion of the responses appearing in the 
1985 poll - those bearing publication dates of 1984-85. Individual 
respondents/scenarios are identified by a 3 - 5 character code. These codes, 
together with the individual poll responses, are recorded in a publication that 
is available upon request. 
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Oil prices are shown here as index numbers, expressed in currency 
units of constant purchasing power with 1980 = 100. To convert to 1984 dol-
lars per barrel, multiply by 0.42. Thus, the 1984 index value = 67 
(equivalent to $2 8/barrel). A solid line connects the median projection for 
1990 with those for 2000 and 2010. According to the conventional wisdom 
(the poll medians), the oil glut of the mid- l 980s will disappear by 1990. 
OPEC will then increase its market share and prices will begin a sustained 
climb to 2000 and beyond. 
Space limitations do not permit us to provide detailed comments on 
each of the individual projections. It should be noted, however, that the high-
est price scenario (REGLD) was not the outcome of an independent model 
of the world oil market. Rather, it was designed to generate a low demand sce-
nario for a single country, Sweden. 
Figure 2 puts the median oil price projections into some perspective . 
First, they are compared with the historical data on the refiners' acquisition 
costs of crude oil imported into the US, adjusted by the US GNP deflator 
(see Energy Information Administration, 1984). If the series were based on 
currency units other than US dollars - or if it were based upon other grades 
or locations of crude oil - the precise amounts of change would differ, but 
Figure 2 
Comparison of poll medians, 1981-1983 
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there would still be the same general appearance - the two price jumps of 
197 3 - 7 4 and 1979 - 80 followed by several years of downward drift. 
Figure 2 also compares the 1/85 medians with those made at two previ-
ous dates: 12/81 and 7 /83. The median projection of the oil price in the year 
2000 has dropped by almost 40 per cent between 1981 and 1985. This is 
almost the same as the 33 per cent decline in the real price of crude oil 
(measured in US dollars) during the same period. Beth of these median pro-
jections imply a three per cent annual increase in the real oil price between 
the date of the forecast and the year 2000. These results cannot be explained 
away simply by differences in the group of respondents from one date to the 
next. 
Like so many other comparisons of energy forecasts, this one has the 
appearance of a downward-folding fan. For a given date, each successive 
price path is lower than its predecessor. Yergin et al (1984) describe this phe-
nomenon by saying that "Today's Vintage V (price forecast) is, like those 
preceding it, overwhelmingly shaped by the projection of current circum-
stances into the future". 
In more technical terms, this may be described as "adaptive 
expectations". That is, each new projection begins with the then-current oil 
price. Past trends are extrapolated linearly (or exponentially) from that point 
- with or without independent cross-checks. 
These ideas may be formalized through a stochastic process known as a 
random walk model. It is supposed that each year's percentage price changes 
are independent of those that occurred the previous year. When accumulated 
over time, the total change approaches a log-normal probability distribution. 
This has an important practical result. The range of uncertainty widens with 
the distance into the future. 
In figure 3 (reproduced from Manne, 1985), the "drift" and variance 
parameters have been based upon the history of international oil prices 
through 1984. On this basis, there is an 84 per cent probability that future oil 
prices will lie below the upper dotted line, and a 16 per cent probability that 
they will lie below the lower one. 
The random walk model suggests an even greater uncertainty of out-
comes than is indicated by the IEW poll itself. Although this conclusion is 
based upon a simple model, it appears robust enough to suggest that there is 
little hope for high precision with respect to long-term price forecasts. Price 
movements are essential for equilibrating supplies and demands, and it 
would be desirable to have more precise long-term forecasts. From the view-
point of a prudent decision-maker, however, all that can be done is to be 
aware of the range of uncertainty and to hedge against both upside and down-
side risks. 
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3. Primary energy consumption and conservation 
Figure 4 provides an overview of total primary energy consumption. In 
1980, the industrialized countries (the USSR/Eastern Europe together with 
the OECD) had only 27 per cent of the world's population, but consumed 80 
per cent of the commercial primary energy. This is much the same pattern as 
prevailed in 1970 and - according to the poll medians - this is likely to per-
sist through 2000. The developing countries have rapidly growing 
populations, but will be unable to afford the cost of large increases in energy 
consumption during the next two decades. 
Energy quantities are less volatile than prices. In percentage terms, 
there are only minor differences between the 7 /83 and the 1/85 median pro-
jections of GNP growth and total energy consumption for the year 2000. The 
decrease in consumption (between the 1983 and 1985 polls) is almost entire-
ly due to a decline in the projection for nuclear energy. The overall change re-
flects the worsening outlook for this specific sector, and cannot be explained 
by changes in the composition of the IEW poll. 
Although the developing countries (OPEC and NODC) will not be-
come major energy consumers in absolute terms, their demands are likely to 
grow rapidly in relation to past levels. Figure 5 provides a regional distribution 
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of annual growth rates realized during the period 1970- 80 and compares 
these with the median growth rates for 1980- 2000. 
According to figure 5, the energy consumption of OECD nations will 
continue to grow at a slower rate than GNP. In part, this may result from a 
shift away from exports of energy-intensive products. Outside the OECD 
region, the median view is that energy consumption will grow at almost the 
same rate as GNP. In the OPEC nations, this may represent a shift towards 
export-oriented industries such as petrochemicals based upon domestic natu-
ral gas. 
For the non-OPEC developing nations, there is a near-constancy of the 
energy-GNP ratio. This needs further examination. Because of the changing 
mix between agriculture, manufacturing and services, there may be few op-
portunities for energy conservation in this region. But there is an alternative 
view - that the prospects for conservation have not been studied as inten-
sively in the developing nations as in the OECD region. On the demand side, 
this is virtually the same issue that Odell (1983) has raised with respect to 
the supply of oil. That is, the developing countries have not yet made a 
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Figure 5 
Annual growth rates of GNP and total primary energy (TPE) 
consumption relative to past levels 
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Note: This.figure provides a regional distribution of annual growth rates realized during the 
period 19 70 - 80, and compares these with the median growth rates/or 1980 - 2000. 
thorough exploration of their options either for oil production or for energy 
conservation. 
For a detailed breakdown of primary energy consumption by fuel, see 
table 2. This table includes the contributions from each of the primary 
sources of energy: oil, gas, coal, nuclear and renewables. The category of 
"renewables" combines conventional hydro-electric and geothermal along 
with solar and other renewables. We continue to obtain erratic responses to 
poll item 16 (solar and other renewables). There are no uniform accounting 
conventions in this area. At the global level, the 11 individual responses for 
the year 2000 covered a range from 2 to 2,110 million tons of oil equivalent 
(mtoe) ! 
For the year 2000, table 2 includes a category termed "conservation". 
This is defined as the difference between the amounts of primary energy 
from the physical sources of supply - and the amount that would have been 
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Table 2 
Median IEW poll responses on primary energy consumption 
mtoe 
(2) (3) (5) (8) (11) (15) (14-16) 
GNP TPE Oil Gas Coal Nuclear Renew ables "Conservation" 
100 1,567 538 382 588 20 58 
137 2,015 559 603 684 87 94 132 
171 2,348 554 716 752 134 143 332 
100 452 93 13 325 0 21 
157 618 107 16 456 1 150 92 
219 895 158 30 632 7 272 95 
100 3,790 1,855 743 770 138 278 
128 4,060 1,690 792 940 358 339 790 
172 4.730 1,703 866 1,360 525 424 1.790 
100 200 130 59 1 0 8 
155 331 215 96 9 0 13 -21 
236 574 319 166 18 3 24 -102 
100 739 408 58 157 4 90 
148 1,078 515 103 263 29 165 16 
232 1,588 691 183 373 50 290 126 
100 6,745 3,000 1,255 1,805 165 473 
132 7,978 3,040 1,620 2,341 417 675 925 
178 9,855 3,314 1,915 3,025 685 1,005 2,151 
(I) GNP (or GDP) is measured as an index 1111111ber with 19/iO = 100. All other items are measured in million tons <!/'oil e£111ivale111. 
(2) The poll medians/iir i11divid11a/.fi1els do 110111ecessarily add llfl IO TPE (total prima1y enerK,Y). Moreove1; the medians.fiir individual region.\ do 1101 
nl'l'l'ssari!Y add up to the world totals. These estimates are construcled independently q/'each 01he1; blll are in rl'asonably close agree111e111. 
(J) In the case o/'poll ill'lll 16 (solar and other rrnewables), there a/'£' widl' variations in de/inilionsji'o111 one orxanization w anothe1: Some groups include 
no11-e·<!lnlllt'rcial energv in this ca1ego1y and others do 1101. Bemuse a nu111ber o/'reSJIOndenls hal'e combined solar and other renewables >l'ilh poll item I./ 
(hydro-l'leclric and xeotherma/). 11•e ha1•e also done so here. Poll item 16 (whl'n reported) has been s11btra!'ted.fi'o111 total pri111a1Ji l't1erg1 · comtt1!//llion and 
prod11c1ion. This adi11s1111e111 fl/'Ol'ides/iir closer !'0111parabi/i1y with the statistical concept q(co111111ercial ene1gy 
consumed ifthe energy-GNP ratio had remained constant since 1980. This is 
not an independent analytical concept, but it provides a convenient short-
hand way to describe a variety of forces : government directives, price-
induced substitution, demand saturation and structural changes in the pat-
tern of GNP growth. 
For the OECD nations, table 2 indicates that conservation is likely to 
contribute more in the way of new energy than the combined total of all the 
conventional sources of supply. It is unclear whether this outcome is based 
upon a careful sector-by-sector analysis, or whether it represents a trend ex-
trapolation from the 1970- 80 decade with its two oil price adjustments. 
4. Oil and gas production and trade 
At the regional level defined by the IEW, there is a negligible amount 
of international trade in coal and electricity. Since oil and gas are the principal 
commodities that move in international trade, we shall focus only on these 
two items. 
Figure 6 presents the poll medians of the global outlook for oil 
consumption, production and trade. According to most respondents, there 
will be only minor increases from the 1980 level of production for the world 
as a whole. This view is hotly disputed by a number of Workshop 
participants. They hold that leasing and taxation issues have led the oil indus-
try to systematically understate the geological prospects. On this basis, they 
estimate that the world's ultimately recoverable conventional resources may 
be 3 -6 trillion barrels rather than 2 trillion barrels (today's conventional 
wisdom). If the minority view is correct, the world's oil industry can continue 
to expand through 2000 and beyond. Given the range of views on oil produc-
tion and consumption, it is no wonder that there are even wider ranges of 
opinion on how much will be exported by OPEC, the "swing" producer, 
throughout this period. 
For a summary of the poll medians on natural gas, see figure 7. At a 
global level, gas production prospects appear brighter than those for oil. 
There is general agreement that the resource base in the USSR and in OPEC 
will permit production to continue to expand, but that expansion will not be 
possible for the OECD countries. Increases in OECD consumption will have 
to be matched by increases in imports from the gas-surplus regions. 
5. Methods of projecting international oil prices 
Among the IEW participants, some groups rely on formal models. 
Others employ expert judgement and scenario analysis . Each of these ap-
proaches has its pros and cons. Formal models may easily become divorced 
from practical realities. Expert judgements are inherently subjective, and 
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Figure 6 
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World regional gas consumption, production and trade 
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may be overly influenced by current events. From the individual IEW poll 
responses, there is no direct way to determine, for example, whether oil 
prices represent an input assumption based upon expert judgement, or 
whether they represent the independent output of a formal model in which 
prices serve to equilibrate supplies and demands. All that is known is that the 
prices and quantities together form a logically consistent picture. 
In order to obtain a better understanding of the methods used by the 
poll respondents, we asked them to indicate how they arrived at the inter-
national oil prices associated with their projections. To date, specific informa-
tion is available for only half of the poll participants. In table 3, these re-
sponses have been grouped into three categories: those that reported the use 
of a formal model of international oil prices at some point in the analytical 
process; those where the origin of the projected oil prices is somewhat 
ambiguous; and those that reported only the use of expert judgements. We 
are aware that this table is incomplete, and that it may contain inaccuracies. 
Corrections and additions will be welcomed. 
Table 3 
Analysis of the international oil market - use of a 
formal model 
No, expert 
judgement 
Yes Ambiguous only 
CIES AGA CPC 
CON BP DRI 
CPON CRIE ORIE 
DOE ERIEA HNPO 
EIA ESCN PIRNC 
ET AMC GNV REG 
GATLY GRI RES PM 
GULF IND RESPP 
IEA RESPI SHLL 
llASA SWEA 
ISP TATA 
RE SPX WBK 
SAUN WEC 
SINGR 
TRT 
15 13 9 
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Table 3 suggests that only a minority of poll respondents base their pro-
jections upon formal models for the determination of international oil prices . 
Most rely upon informal methods. Even among those that do employ inter-
national oil models, it is clear that the results are cross-checked in other 
ways. In any case, the independence of the oil price projections is an impor-
tant problem that deserves further investigation. 
Because there are advantages in both formal and informal approaches, a 
combination of methods may be more reliable than any one by itself. The ad-
vantages of a combined approach have been documented empirically in 
short-term macro-economic and sales forecasting. See, for example, Makri-
dakis and Winkler (1983). In these cases , there is evidence that a consensus 
forecast may have a lower average error than the individual analyses from 
which it is built up. The same principles may also apply to long-term projec-
tions of international oil prices and the quantities traded. 
6. Demand elasticities survey 
In the market economies, price changes provide an incentive for energy 
conservation. Accordingly, it seemed useful to conduct a separate poll on the 
values of the price and income elasticities of demand that are either explicit 
or implicit in the IEW poll responses. For this purpose, we concentrated on 
those in which the international price of oil is an output result rather than an 
input assumption. 
The original poll responses do not enable us to determine whether oil 
prices are an input or an output. They do, however, provide one clue along 
these lines. Since oil prices are unlikely to be an output when the analysis is 
confined to a single country or to a small region of the world, it was supposed 
that oil prices might be an output of each of the two dozen responses that 
included both oil prices and the quantities consumed either for the OECD 
region or for the market economies as a whole. In February 1984, these 
groups were asked the following questions: 
(a) In principle, would it be possible to make a controlled 
comparison, employing an oil price or a GNP growth different 
from your baseline projections? 
(b) In practice, by July 1984, will it be possible for you to send in one 
or more IEW poll forms , making a controlled comparison (for the 
OECD region and/or for the market economies as a whole) cover-
ing the following scenarios? 
(i) Gradual productivity gains (or losses) leading to a 
GNP growth index (1980 = 100) that is 25 points lower 
(or higher) than your baseline response for the year 2000. 
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(ii) Gradual oil supply gains (or losses) leading to an oil 
price index (1980 = 100) that is 25 points lower (or 
higher) than your baseline response for the year 2000. 
In effect, question (a) asks whether the projections are based upon a 
formal model that is currently operational. Question (b) is divided into two 
parts. From the response to part (i), one can infer GNP elasticities (holding 
oil prices constant). From part (ii), one can estimate the price elasticities 
(holding GNP constant). These questions appear straightforward, but in 
practice turned out to be somewhat ambiguous. It was not until late 1984 that 
we succeeded in obtaining nine usable responses. In retrospect, it was an 
error to have requested price and GNP variations in terms of index points 
rather than percentage changes. Accordingly, the quantity responses are not 
reported directly, but are converted into the elasticity estimates shown in 
table 4. 
A number of poll participants declined to take part in this survey. Some 
were unable to do so because their analyses were based upon expert 
judgement/scenario methods rather than upon formal models. Controlled 
comparisons then become difficult or impossible. Others were unable to par-
ticipate in the survey because of lack of time - or because their models were 
no longer operational. Among the groups that responded, one requested 
anonymity and is therefore labelled RESPX (respondent X). Another (EIA) 
was unable to report numerical results beyond 1995. 
According to table 4, the consensus view is that the GNP elasticity of 
oil consumption is approximately 1.0, and that the intermediate-run price 
elasticity is 0.3 . That is, a one per cent change in GNP will lead to a one per 
cent change in oil consumption - holding prices and other demand determi-
nants constant; and a one per cent increase in crude oil prices will lead to a 
three per cent decline in consumption - holding GNP, etc, constant. 
Among the GNP elasticities, the only significantly different value from 
unity is that of Singer (1983) - here abbreviated SINGR. His poll response 
is based on a case in which the total OECD demand for oil would grow at 1.5 
per cent per year if prices remained constant. This may be interpreted in 
terms of a GNP elasticity of 0.6 and a GNP growth rate of 2.5 per cent per 
year. The low GNP elasticity goes a long way towards explaining why Singer's 
oil price projections are so much lower than others. 
Because of one unanticipated difficulty, the price elasticities are 
labelled as intermediate, rather than long run. That is, the questionnaire 
asked the participants to run their models with gradual rather than sudden 
changes. A gradual change is more realistic in appearance, but is not as effi-
cient for computing a long-run price elasticity. In several of these models, no 
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Table4 
Elasticities of oil demand 
Oil price elasticity, 
intermediate run GNP 
Respondent Region (absolute value) elasticity 
CIES OECD 0.54 1.00 
CIES MKT 0.31 1.00 
CON MKT 0.57 
CON MKT 0.44 
CON MKT 0.98 
CON MKT 1.02 
EIA MKT 0.28 
GATLY MKT 0 .32 
GATLY MKT 0 .30 
GATLY MKT 0.99 
GATLY MKT 0.98 
GULF MKT 0 .1 7 1.00 
llASA OECD 0 .1 0 
llASA OECD 0.86 
RES PX OECD 0.33 
RESPX MKT 0 .26 
SINGR OECD 0.34 0.60 
TRT6 OECD 0.29 1.00 
TRT6 MKT 0.25 1.00 
more than half of the full long-term response will have occurred by the year 
2000. With the benefit of hindsight, this difficulty could have been avoided by 
asking respondents to complete the oil supply or the income changes by 1990 
rather than 2000. Having failed to do this, the price elasticity estimates are de-
scribed as intermediate run. Independent evidence suggests that the long-run 
price elasticities may have twice the values shown here. 
For five of the nine respondents, the value of the intermediate-run price 
elasticity is approximately 0.3 . These five estimates may not be altogether 
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independent. Three participated in the world oil study undertaken by the 
Energy Modelling Forum (1982). There, all the models were run under the 
general guideline that 0.6 was the long-run price elasticity of demand for 
crude oil. This was exactly the numerical value adopted for the OECD region 
in the scenario described here as TRT6 (Manne and Preckel). This was also 
the elasticity input assumption adopted by IEW respondent G ATLY 
(Gately) . 
Among the price elasticities shown in table 4, the lowest value is 0.1 
(reported by IIASA). This result can be traced directly to the methodology 
employed in the IIASA global energy studies. GNP growth and the MEDEE 
accounting framework together determine the demands for "useful" energy 
services. Accordingly, energy prices affect interfuel substitution, but not the 
level of useful energy demands. This appears to be the principal reason for 
the low price elasticities of oil consumption that are implicit in the IIASA 
results. 
A value of 0.54 (for CIES) is the highest among the intermediate-run 
price elasticities shown in table 4. It is unclear whether this response repre-
sents a controlled comparison between the price and the income effects of 
additional oil supplies. If this does represent a controlled comparison, the 
CIES scenarios imply that oil prices have an extraordinarily high impact 
upon long-term GNP growth rates . For the OECD region in the year 2000, 
the GNP index is 197 in CIESH versus 173 in CIESL (the high versus low 
demand scenario) . 
7. Concluding comment 
This paper has shown that there continues to be a wide range of view-
points on the long-range outlook for international energy supplies, demands 
and prices. Rather than attempt to promote an artificial consensus in this 
area, we believe that the role of the IEW is to reach second-order agreement. 
That is, how wide is the range of uncertainty likely to be? At a number of 
points, we have reported median values, but these are not intended as the 
best or the most likely forecasts . We use these because they represent per-
haps the most descriptive single summary description of the responses. Any 
translation from poll results into probability distributions is at the risk of the 
translator. 
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APPENDIX A-1 
International Energy Workshop poll 
Country/Region 
Organization/Project 
Reference (including date) of most recent report 
1980 
Index numbers, constant 
purchasing power, 1 980 = 1 00 
1. International price of crude 100 
oil (e.g. Arabian Light) 
2. Real GNP (or GDP) 100 
Primary energy, commercial, 
million tons of oil equivalent (mtoe) ' 
3. Total consumption 
4. Total production 
5. Oil, consumption 3 
) 
6. Oil, production -
' 7. Oil, exports - imports -
8. Natural gas, consumption 
9. Natural gas, production 
1 0. Natural gas, exports - imports 
11. Coal, consumption 3 
12. Coal, production J 
1 3. Coal, exports - imports J 
14. Hydro-electric and geothermal 
15. Nuclear energy 
1 6. Solar and other renewables 
Secondary energy, terrawatt-hours (TWh) 
17. Total electricity generation 
1. Useful approximations: 1 mtoe = 1013 kilocalories 
0.65 mtoe = 1 million tons coal 
1990 2000 2010 
0.83 mtoe = 1 billion cubic metres natural gas 
23 mtoe = 1 quad BTU 
50 mtoe/year = 1 million barrels daily 
2. Oil includes natural gas liquids, unconventional oils and synthetics based on tar sands and 
shale oil. 
3. Coal includes soidfuels such as lignite and peat. Includes coal consumed for manufacture 
of synthetic fuels. 
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APPENDIX A-2 
IEW poll respondents, January 1985 
This includes only those responses dated 1 983 or later. 
Last year Country/region 
Organization/projects reported coverage 
AGABD, American Gas Association - base, 2000 us 
AGAHD, low, high demand. May 1984 
AGALD 
ASSU Academy of Sciences of the USSR, June 2010 USSR 
1983 
BLNCE BALANCE Canadian Energy Model, T.E. 2000 Canada 
Daniel and H.M. Goldberg, University of 
Alberta, January 1 984 
BNL Brookhaven National Laboratory, 1983 2010 us 
BP British Petroleum, October 1 984 2000 4, 7, 5+6. OECD 
Europe, US 
CEC, Commission of the European 2000 Belgium, Denmark, 
CECCP, Communities - cooperation, Europe Federal Rep. of 
CECEU, and free competition scenarios, and Germany, France, 
CECFC results identical for all three Greece, Ireland, 
scenarios, June 1983 Italy, 
Luxembourg, 
Netherlands, UK 
CERG Cambridge Energy Research Group, 1985 2010 4,7 
CHASE Chase Manhattan Bank, March 1983 2000 7 
CHVRN Chevron Corporation, July 1984 2010 4 
CIESH, Center for International Energy Studies, 2010 3-8 
CIESL Erasmus University - high and low energy 
growth, October 1 984 
CON Conoco, April 1984 2000 4-7, 5+6, Africa, 
Asia, Japan, Latin 
America, Middle 
East. OECD 
Europe, other 
OECD, US 
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CPOM 
CRAN 
CRIEH, 
CRIEL. 
CRIER 
CZ MOE 
DNMOE 
DOE 
ORI 
ORIE 
EEF 
EIA 
ENI 
EPRIM, 
EPRIR 
ERIEA 
ESCN 
ET AMC 
308 
Central Planning Office, Netherlands. 
October 1984 
A. Cranston, US Senate, August 1 983 
Central Research Institute of Electric Power 
Industry - high, low and reference GNP 
growth, November 1 983 
Czechoslovakian Federal Ministry of Fuel 
and Energy 
Danish Ministry of Energy, 1983 
US Department of Energy, Office of 
Economic Analysis, January 1985 
Data Resources Inc., November 1 984 
ORI Europe, September 1984 
UN Economic Commission for Europe, 
General Energy Unit, "An Efficient Energy 
Future", March 1 983 
US Energy Information Administration -
1 990 mid-price scenario, 1 984 
Ente Nazionale ldrocarburi, 1983 
0 . Yu. Electric Power Research Institute -
minimum and reasonable expectations, 
December 1983 
J. Edmonds and J. Reilly, Institute for 
Energy Analysis, July 1 983 
Energy Study Centre, Netherlands, 
December 1 984 
ETA-MACRO, J.-L. Aburto, A.S. Manne and 
S. Rogers, Trinational Project, January 
1985 
2000 Netherlands 
2000 us 
2010 Japan 
2000 Czechoslovakia 
2000 Denmark 
2010 4-7,US 
2000 4, 5, 6, us 
2000 OECD Europe 
2000 1, US 
1990 4, 7, 5+6, OECD 
Europe/North 
America/Pacific 
1990 4 
2000 us 
2000 1 -4, 7. 8, Middle 
East, other market 
economies 
2000 Netherlands 
2010 Canada. Mexico, 
us 
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ETSHD Energy Technology Systems Analysis 2010 Australia, Austria, 
ETSLD Project of the International Energy Agency Belgium, Federal 
- high and low demand cases, 1983 Rep. of Germany, 
Ireland, Italy, 
Japan, 
Netherlands, 
Norway, Spain, 
Sweden, 
Switzerland, UK, 
US: Sum of 14 
IEA countries 
GATLY D. Gately, New York University, 1 983 2000 5, 7 
GNVBD, University of Geneva - base, high and low 2000 Switzerland 
GNVHD, demand, August 1 983 
GNVLD 
GRI Gas Research Institute, October 1 984 2000 us 
GULFC, Gulf Oil Corporation, Economics Division, 2000 7, us 
GULFH, slow climb, hard lines and plateau 
GULFP scenarios, December 1 983 
HNPO Hungarian National Planning Office, Energy 2010 Hungary 
Modelling Group, January 1 984 
IAEAH, International Atomic Energy Agency - high 2000 4, Eastern Europe, 
IAEAL and low demand, September 1 984 Latin America, 
OECD Europe/ 
North America / 
Pacific 
IEA International Energy Agency, 1984 2000 4 
IFPF, lnstitut Francais du Petrole - solid and 2000 3-8 
IFPM, moderate revival, stagnation, September 
IFPS 1983 
llAGS International Institute for Applied Systems 2010 OECD Europe 
Analysis - gas study, July 1984 
llASA International Institute for Applied Systems 2010 1-4, 7-8 
Analysis, November 1983 
INBST J. Brady, National Board for Science and 2010 Ireland 
Technology, Ireland, April/May 1 983 
Autumn 1986 309 
IND 
IPE 
ISP 
JAERI 
LEDB 
MERZ 
NEB 
NGODP 
NRMPE 
OBENA, 
OBENB 
OLADE 
OPEC, 
OPECD 
PILOT 
PIRMC 
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Standard Oil Company of Indiana. May 
1984 
IPE Model, M. Choucri, Massachusetts 
Institute of Technology, April 1984 
K.-P. Moeller. ISP Energy Projections, 1 983 
Japan Atomic Energy Research Institute, 
March 1983 
W .J. Schmidt. University of Mining and 
Metallurgy, Leoben, 1983 
N. Merzagora, Economic Analysis Division, 
ENEA, June 1 983 
National Energy Board, September 1 984 
International Natural Gas Study, Harvard 
University, and the OPEC Downstream 
Project, East-West Centre, B. 
Mossavar-Rahmani and F. Fesharaki, 1983 
Norwegian Royal Ministry of Petroleum and 
Energy, 1 984 
Observatoire de l'Energie - scenarios A 
and B, January 1983 
Organization Latinoamericana de Energia, 
May 1983 
Organization of the Petroleum Exporting 
Countries - long-term energy models. 
domestic energy requirements, 1 983 
PILOT Model, P.H. McAllister and Model, 
Stanford University, March 1984 
Petroleum Industry Research Foundation, 
Inc., September 1 983 
2000 1 -8, other 
markets, other 
CPE 
2000 4-7 
2000 Federal Rep. of 
Germany 
2010 
2010 
2000 
2000 
1990 
2000 
2000 
2000 
2010 
2000 
2000 
Japan 
8 
Italy 
Canada 
5; Algeria, 
Ecuador, Gabon. 
Indonesia, l.R. 
Iran, Iraq, Kuwait, 
S.P. Libyan A.J., 
Nigeria, Qatar, 
Saudi Arabia, 
UAE. Venezuela 
Norway 
France 
Latin America 
4-7 
us 
3, 7,8 
OPEC Review 
REGBD, L. Lundqvist, Research Group for Urban 2010 Sweden 
REGHD, and Regional Planning - base, high and 
RE GLD low demand, 1 984 
RESPH Respondent, H, 1 983 2000 Japan 
RESPI Respondent, I, 1 983 2000 7; 5+6, Japan, 
OECD Europe, US 
RESPJ Respondent, J, March 1984 2000 Canada, Mexico, 
us 
RES PK, Respondents, K, L, December 1 984 2000 4, 5, us 
RESPL 
RES PM, Respondents M, P, December 1984 2000 8 
RESPP 
ROL K. Roland, Central Bureau of Statistics, 2000 OECD Europe 
Norway, February 1 984 
ROWSE J. Rowse, University of Calgary, November 2000 Canada 
1984 
SAUNS, H. Saunders, TOSCO, smooth and volatile 2000 3-7 
SAU NV scenarios, January 1 984 
SHLLM, Shell International - muddling-through and 2000 7,8 
SHLLR restructuring, December 1 984 
SINGR S.F. Singer, 1983 2010 4 
SMIE1, Spanish Ministry of Industry and Energy - 2000 1, 2, 8, Africa, 
SMIE2 scenarios 1 and 2, 1 983 Japan, Latin 
America, Middle 
East, OECD 
Europe/ North 
America/ America, 
South Asia, 
South-East Asia, 
and Australasia 
SMIL V. Smil, University of Manitoba, 1 983 2010 3,8 
SWEA Swedish National Energy Administration, 1990 Sweden 
December 1 984 
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TATA 
TAVNR 
TRT4, 
TRT6 
UN 
UNIDO 
WBK 
WECHG, 
WECLG 
WILPP, 
WILRF 
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R.K. Pachawri, Tata Energy Research 
Institute. 1 98 3 
TAVANIR Corporation, Energy Ministry of 
Iran, April 1 984 
TRT Model, A.S. Manne and P.V. Preckel. 
Stanford University - elasticities of OECD 
oil demand substitution = .40, .60, 
December 1983 
2010 
2010 
2000 
United Nations Statistical Office, June 1980 
1984 
United Nations Industrial Development 1 990 
Organization, February 1 983 
World Bank, 1 984 
World Energy Conference - high and low 
growth, December 1 983 
J. Willars, policy projection and reference 
case. November 1983 
1990 
2000 
1990 
India 
l.R. Iran 
4-7 
1-8 
2, Eastern Europe, 
Japan, Latin 
America, OECD 
Europe/North 
America 
1-8 
1-3, 7, 8, 5+6, 
Africa south of 
Sahara, Latin 
America, North 
Africa and Middle 
East, OECD 
Europe/North 
America/Pacific, 
South Asia / 
South-East Asia 
Mexico 
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APPENDIX A-3 
Energy-GDP ratios, by region 
Soviet Union, Eastern Europe and sub-regions 
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WECLG 
WECHG 
W8K 
SMIE2 
SMIE1 
IND 
llASA 
ERIEA 
if there is an even number of poll responses. 
the two projections closest to the median are 
denoted by M. 
100.000 90.929 
HNGRY 100.000 ASSU USSR 104168 ASSU 
USSR 100.000 IND A1 93 .488 SMIE1 
A1 100.000 WBK A1 90.929 SMIE2 
A1 100.000 HNPO HNGRY 90.164 IND 
A1 100.000 llASA A1 87 .861 WECLG 
A1 100000 HNPO 
A1 100.000 llASA 
A1 100 000 WECHG 
A1 100.000 ERIEA 
Al 100 000 
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79.388 
USSR 100.679 
A1 92584 
A1 92495 
A1 85 .813 
A1 79 388 
HNGRY 78 94 7 
A1 77 .188 
A1 72 816 
A1 69 731 
2010 
67.560 
llASA A1 67 560 
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30.00-.----------------------------------------------
1980 1990 
Notes: 1980 = I 00. 
Medians: 
WECLG 
WE CHG 
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SMIE1 
IND 
llASA 
ERltA 
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If there is an even number of poll responses, 
the two projections closest to the median are 
denoted by M. 
100.000 79.049 
A2 100.000 llASA A2 92 .919 ERIEA 
A2 100.000 IND A2 79 .322 SMIE1 
A2 100.000 WBK A2 78.776 llASA 
A2 100.000 SMIL A2 74 479 WECLG 
A2 100.000 WE CHG 
A2 100 000 IND 
A2 100.000 SMIL 
A2 100 000 
2000 2010 
97 .906 90.411 
A2 103.772 llASA A2 90.411 
A2 102 826 
A2 100.650 
A2 97 906 
A2 73 570 
A2 65 120 
A2 57 065 
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AESPI us 100000 ET AMC CAN 107 683 BLNCE CAN 102 874 
PILOT us 100000 BNL us 98.955 ET AMC CAN 97 740 
GULFP us 100000 BLNCE CAN 98 940 SMIE2 OE CON 88 574 
GULFH us 100 000 NEB CAN 90.530 SMIEl OECDN 88490 
GULFC us 100 000 ETSLD us 87 289 BNL us 88.235 
GRI us 100.000 ETSHD us 86.094 ETSHD us 82 .910 
EfSLD us 100 000 EPRIA us 84.569 NEB CAN 79 968 
ETSHD us 100000 GULFH us 84 301 GULFH us 78 068 
ET AMC us 100 000 EPAIM us 84091 EfSLD us 77 855 
EP RIR us 100 000 GRI us 83 191 WECLG OECDN 77 028 
EPAIM us 100 000 EIA OECDN 83 140 WECHG OECDN 75 351 
DAI us 100.000 RESPI us 83 136 EPHIR us 74 777 
DOE us 100.000 ORI us 81 972 RESPI us 74 681 
CON us 100 000 ET AMC us 81 847 ORI us 73 94 7 
BP us 100 000 DOE us 80 153 GAi us 73 374 
BNL us 100 000 GULFP us 79 560 EPRIM us 73 338 
AGALD us 100 000 CON us 79 502 ET AMC us 72 679 
AGAHD us 100 000 GULFC us 78 645 DOE us 7 2 5 73 
AGABD us 100 000 PILOT us 78 316 GULFP us 71 703 
WECLG OECDN 100 000 BP us 78 224 GULFC us 71 614 
W E CHG OECDN 100 000 PILOT us 68 324 
SMIE2 OECDN 100 000 CON us 68 035 
SMIEl OECDN 100 000 BP us 67 339 
EIA OECDN 100 000 AGALD us 63 4 1 2 
NEB CAN 100 000 AGABD us 62 833 
ET AMC CAN 100 000 AGAHD us 60419 
BLNCE CAN 100 000 
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68.898 
BNL us 83 497 
ETSHO us 80 153 
ETSLD us 74 44 3 
E ;AMC us 68 898 
DOE us 65 961 
DAI us 65 5o4 
GRI us 64 515 
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Medians: 
ETSLO UK 
100.000 
100.000 
100.000 
100.000 
100.000 
100.000 
ETSHO UK 
CECFC UK 
CECEU UK 
CECCP 
GNVLO 
GNVHO 
GNVBO 
ETSLO 
ETSHO 
SWEA 
REGLO 
REG HO 
REG BO 
ETSLO 
ETSHO 
ETSLO 
ETSHO 
ETSLO 
ETSHO 
WECLG 
UK 
SWISS 
SWISS 
SWISS 
SWISS 
SWISS 
SWEDE 
SWEDE 
SWEDE 
SWEDE 
SWEDE 
SWEDE 
SPAIN 
SPAIN 
OSTER 
OSTER 
OECOE 
100.000 
100.000 
100.000 
100.000 
100.000 
100.000 
100.000 
100.000 
100.000 
100.000 
100.000 
100.000 
100.000 
100.000 
100.000 
100.000 
WECHG OE COE 100.000 
SMIE2 
SMIE1 
RESPI 
EIA 
ORIE 
CON 
BP 
NRMPE 
ETSLO 
ETSHO 
ETSLO 
ETSHO 
ESCN 
OECOE 100.000 
OECOE 1 00.000 
OECOE 1 00.000 
OECOE 100.000 
OECOE 1 00.000 
OECOE 1 00.000 
OECOE 100.000 
NORWY 100.000 
NORWY 100.000 
NORWY 100.000 
NLAND 1 00.000 
NLAND 1 00.000 
NLAND 100.000 
CPON NLANO 
CECFC NLANO 
CECEU NLAND 
CECCP NLANO 
CEC LUXBG 
MERZ ITALY 
ETSLO ITALY 
ETSHD ITALY 
CECFC ITALY 
CECEU ITALY 
CECCP ITALY 
CEC GREC 
ISP FRG 
ETSLD FRG 
ETSHD FRG 
CECFC FRG 
CECEU FRG 
CECCP FRG 
OBENB FR 
OBENA FR 
MNDMS FR 
CECFC FR 
CECEU FR 
CECCP FR 
INBST EIRE 
ETSLO EIRE 
ETSHD EIRE 
CECFC EIRE 
CECEU EIRE 
CECCP EIRE 
DNMOE ONMRK 
CECFC ONMRK 
CECEU ONMRK 
CECCP ONMRK 
ETSLD BELGM 
ETSHD 
CEC 
ETSLD 
ETSHD 
BEL GM 
BEL GM 
AUSTR 
AUS TR 
100.000 
100.000 
100.000 
100.000 
100.000 
100.000 
100.000 
100.000 
100.000 
100.000 
100.000 
100.000 
100.000 
100.000 
100.000 
100.000 
100.000 
100.000 
100.000 
100.000 
100.000 
100.000 
100.000 
100.000 
100.000 
100.000 
100.000 
100.000 
100.000 
100.000 
100.000 
100.000 
100.000 
100.000 
100.000 
100.000 
100.000 
100.000 
100.000 
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ETSHD 
CECFC 
CECEU 
CECFC 
CEC 
ETSHO 
ETSHO 
ETSLO 
ETSLO 
ETSLD 
CECCP 
NRMPE 
REGHO 
ETSLO 
CECCP 
CECEU 
EIA 
ETSLO 
CON 
CECFC 
CECFC 
ETSLO 
BP 
ETSLO 
ETSHO 
ORIE 
RESPI 
ETSHO 
CPON 
CECFC 
ETSLO 
CECCP 
ETSLO 
CECCP 
ETSLO 
SPAIN 
EIRE 
EIRE 
ITALY 
GREC 
NLANO 
AUS TR 
NLANO 
SPAIN 
AUSTR 
EIRE 
NO RWY 
SWEDE 
NO RWY 
ITALY 
ITALY 
OECOE 
SWEDE 
OECOE 
FR 
ONMRK 
EIRE 
OE COE 
BEL GM 
NORWY 
OE COE 
OE COE 
EIRE 
NLANO 
UK 
FRG 
ONMRK 
UK 
UK 
SWISS 
CECFC NLANO 
INBST EIRE 
ETSHO BELGM 
MNOMS FR 
CECCP FR 
ETSHO SWEDE 
CECFC FRG 
MERZ ITALY 
ETSHO FRG 
ETSHO UK 
CECEU NLANO 
CECEU UK 
CECEU FR 
ISP FRG 
ETSHO ITALY 
OBENA FR 
CECCP NLANO 
ETSHO ITALY 
REGBO SWEDE 
OBENB FR 
ESCN NLANO 
ONMOE ONMRK 
CEC 
CEC 
CECCP 
CECEU 
CECEU 
ETSHO 
ETSHO 
SWEA 
ETSLD 
REG LO 
LUXBG 
BEL GM 
FRG 
ONMRK 
FRG 
SWISS 
OSTER 
SWEDE 
OSTER 
SWEDE 
115.009 
111.7B9 
109.127 
106.B70 
106.667 
101.695 
100.910 
100.275 
99.421 
98.932 
98.425 
97 .344 
97 .318 
96.038 
95 .5 70 
95.420 
93.118 
91 .857 
91 .682 
91 .272 
91 .173 
91 .075 
90.847 
90.687 
90.618 
90.404 
90.181 
89.869 
88.423 
88.333 
88.274 
87 .060 
86.793 
86.290 
86.207 
86.207 
86.133 
86.120 
85 .959 
85.550 
85 .182 
85 .156 
85.034 
84.541 
84.283 
83 .802 
83.740 
83.655 
83 .615 
83.144 
83.064 
82.552 
82.457 
82.079 
81.731 
81 .579 
81 .197 
80.000 
80.000 
79.772 
79.745 
79.242 
78.914 
78.463 
76.086 
74.405 
70.994 
78.862 
CECFC 
ETSHO 
CECCP 
CECEU 
ETSLO 
CECFC 
REGHD 
CEC 
ETSHD 
ETSLD 
NRMPE 
SMIE1 
EIRE 1 28.205 
SPAIN 1 12.505 
EIRE 105.337 
EIRE 102.94 1 
SPAIN 99.679 
ITALY 98 .728 
SWEDE 97 .426 
GREC 95 .238 
NLAND 93.599 
NLAND 92.308 
NORWY 92 .069 
OECOE 91 .681 
SMIE2 OECDE 91 .544 
ETSHO AUSTR 88.944 
WECLG OECDE 87 .693 
MNDMS FR 87 043 
ETSLD NORWY 86.580 
ETSLD AUSTR 86 .004 
ETSHD EIRE 95 .942 
INBST EIRE 
CPON NLAND 
ETSHD SWISS 
CECEU ITALY 
ETSLO SWEDE 
CECFC FR 
CECFC DNMRK 
ETSLD EIRE 
CECCP ITALY 
RESPI OECDE 
CON OE COE 
ETSLD SWISS 
ETSLD BELGM 
ETSHD BELGM 
ETSLD FRG 
BP OECOE 
WECHG OECOE 
CECFC UK 
ETSLD UK 
ETSHD NORWY 
CE CFC 
ESCN 
ETSHO 
ETSHO 
CECEU 
ISP 
CEC 
ETSLD 
ETSHO 
REGBD 
CECFC 
MERZ 
ORIE 
ETSHD 
OBENA 
CECCP 
CECCP 
CECEU 
ETSHD 
ETSLO 
NLAND 
NLANO 
FRG 
SWEDE 
NLAND 
FRG 
LUXBG 
OSTER 
UK 
SWEDE 
FRG 
ITALY 
OECDE 
OSTER 
FR 
FR 
UK 
UK 
ITALY 
ITALY 
CECEU FR 
CECCP NLANO 
CECCP DNMRK 
ONMOE ONMRK 
CECEU 
CECCP 
CEC 
REGLO 
CECEU 
OBENB 
DNMRK 
FRG 
BELGM 
SWEDE 
FRG 
FR 
83.494 
83.030 
82.763 
82 .387 
81 .967 
81 .822 
81 .222 
80.808 
80.673 
80.5 78 
80351 
80.24 7 
79 .966 
79.451 
79.294 
78.862 
78.560 
77 .027 
76.776 
76.244 
75.353 
74.869 
73.731 
73.694 
73.216 
73 .209 
73.099 
73.052 
72.991 
72.522 
72.4 74 
72.333 
72.322 
71.851 
71.661 
71 .461 
70.455 
69 .207 
69.200 
68 .888 
68.510 
67.979 
67 .189 
66.288 
65.434 
64.609 
63.353 
62.681 
61 .587 
60.850 
73.558 
ETSHD SPAIN 
ETSLD SPAIN 
REGHD SWEDE 
ETSHO NLANO 
ETSLD NLANO 
ETSHO EIRE 
INBST EIRE 
ETSLD EIRE 
ETSHD AUSTR 
ETSHO SWISS 
ETSLD NORWY 
ETSLD AUSTR 
ETSLO SWISS 
ETSLD SWEDE 
ETSLD UK 
ETSLD OSTER 
ETSLO FRG 
ETSHD 8ELGM 
REGBD SWEDE 
ETSHD UK 
ETSHD FRG 
ETSHO OSTER 
ETSLO BELGM 
ETSHO NORWY 
ETSHO SWEDE 
ETSLD ITALY 
ETSHO ITALY 
113.269 
98.112 
96.979 
88.971 
88.431 
85 .085 
84.255 
81 .699 
81.350 
80.228 
80.175 
78.074 
75.503 
74 .074 
73.042 
71 .942 
71 .659 
69.847 
67.592 
65 .212 
65 .048 
64.147 
63.4 77 
63 .025 
62 .832 
60.752 
5 9.486 
REGLO SWEDE 54.720 
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if rhere is an even number of poll responses, 
rile rwo prqjecrions closesr ro rhe median are denored by M. 
Medians : 100.000 84.338 73.513 
WECLG OE CDP 100 000 IEA A4 91 640 SMIEl JAPAN 95 388 
WE CH G OE CDP 100 000 IFPS A4 91 .185 IFPS A4 86 906 
EIA OECDF 100 000 IFPM A4 89803 IEA A4 83 063 
CON OECDO 100 000 RESP! JAPAN 88.540 IFPM A4 81 937 
SMIEl JAPAN 100000 EIA OE CDP 88.092 WECLG OE CDP 81 005 
RESPI JAPAN 100 000 EIA A4 87 922 ERIEA A4 80 51 0 
RES PH JAPAN 100000 CON OECDO 87 .273 RESPI JAPAN 78 815 
JAERI JAPAN 100000 IFPF A4 86 942 CON OECDO 78 370 
ETSLD JAPAN 100 000 ENI A4 86 296 CHVRN A4 77 891 
ETSHD J APAN 100000 CHVRN A4 85 295 llASA 114 75 809 
CRIER JAPAN 100 000 CON A4 84.851 IFPF A4 75 695 
CRIEL JAPAN 100.000 llASA A4 84.559 WE CHG OECDP 74 291 
CRIEH JAPAN 100 000 ETSHD JAPAN 84.442 ETSHD JAPAN 74 013 
CON JAPAN 100 000 WBK A4 84 338 CON A4 73 513 
WBK A4 100 000 JAERI JAPAN 83 589 JAERI JAPAN 72 75 7 
SAUNV A4 100 000 LIEF A4 81 788 IND A4 69 457 
SAUNS A4 100 000 CERG A4 81 .193 ETSLD JAPAN 69 .370 
LIEF A4 100.000 ETSLD JAPAN 81 .189 CERG A4 68.387 
IND A4 100.000 BP A4 80.85 7 RES PH JAPAN 68.306 
llASA A4 100 000 IND A4 80.562 SAUNS A4 67 692 
lFPS A4 100.000 RES PH JAPAN 80.133 CRIEL JAPAN 67 549 
IFPM A4 100 000 CRIER JAPAN 79.101 CRIER JAPAN 67 068 
IFPF A4 100000 CRIEH JAPAN 78.627 LIEF A4 66 855 
IEA A4 100.000 CRIEL JAPAN 7 8.419 CON JAPAN 6G 536 
ERIEA A4 100.000 SAUNS A4 78 142 CRIEH JAPAN 65 426 
ENI A4 100000 CON JAPAN 77 032 BP A4 64 134 
EIA A4 100 000 SAUNV A4 76 694 SAUNV A4 62 951 
CON A4 100000 
CHVRN A4 100000 
CFR G A4 100 000 
BP A4 100 000 
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65. 753 
ETSHD JAPAN 72 496 
CHVRN A4 70 188 
JAERI JAPAN 69 247 
llASA A4 67 800 
ETSLD JAPAN 65 753 
CRIEL JAPAN 62 242 
CRIER JAPAN 604 71 
CERG A4 5 7.815 
CRIEH JAPAN 5 7 120 
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30.00-.------------..-------------------------------~ 
1980 1990 
Notes: 1980 = I 00. 
fl there is an even number of poll responses, 
rhe two projections closest to the median are 
denored by M. 
Medians: 100.000 110.024 
WBK A5 100000 IND A5 130.818 
IND A5 100.000 WBK A5 121 .139 
IFPS A5 100.000 CON A5 120.047 
IFPM AS 100.000 IFPM A5 100.000 
IFPF AS 100.000 IFPF AS 98160 
CON AS 100.000 IFPS AS 97 .973 
Autumn 1986 
2000 2010 
104.452 
IND A5 124.919 
CON A5 122.354 
IFPF A5 104.452 
IFPM AS 102.767 
IFPS AS 102.740 
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30.00r...--------------------------.r-------------.r-~ 
1980 1990 2000 2010 
No1cs: 1980 = JOO. 
If there is an even number o/pol/ responses, 
1he two projec1ions closest to the median are 
denoted by M. 
Medians : 100.000 103.816 92 .930 90.901 
WILRF MEX 100000 fATA INDIA 109.074 IFPF A6 1 09 740 TATA INDIA 9 5.8 3 2 
WILPP MEX 100.000 SAU NV A6 106 5 78 IFPM A6 108 285 El AMC MEX 8 5 97 0 
WECLG SEASI 100.000 SAUNS A6 105 441 IFPS A6 1 06 862 
WECLG SASIA 100.000 IFPF A6 104.908 SAUNS A6 104 999 
WECLG AFSS 100.000 IFPM A6 104 517 SAUNV A6 102 162 
WE CHG SEASI 100000 IFPS A6 104.085 CON A6 102 151 
WE CHG SASIA 100.000 CON A6 103.547 TATA INDIA 95 272 
WE CHG AFSS 100.000 WILRF MEX 103 122 WECLG SASIA 92 930 
TATA INDIA 100.000 IND A6 99 718 IND A6 90 127 
ET AMC MEX 100.000 WILPP MEX 99 394 WE CHG SASIA 88 551 
WBK A6 100000 WBK A6 99 006 WE CHG AFSS 86 939 
SAU NV A6 100000 ETAMC MEX 95 .998 WECLG AFSS 86 213 
SAUNS A6 100000 ET AMC MEX 86 . 196 
IND A6 100.000 WECLG SEASI 75 428 
IFPS A6 100000 WE CHG SEASI 71 146 
IFPM A6 100.000 
IFPF A6 100.000 
CON A6 100000 
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